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In an attempt to determine if individual risk preferences change 
under group conditions, individuals and groups were observed 
when making binary decisions. The expected values of the out- 
comes were held constant while the probabilities of the two 
events varied across conditions. As previously, it was found that 
when the probabilities of the two events are .6 and .4, a con- 
servative shift is obtained. When these probabilities are .8 and 
-2, however, there was a tendency for groups to shift toward 
risk. A two-stage parameter-free model was suggested to account 
for individual and group choices. 
Current theories which deal with the so-called “risky shift” phenom- 
enon (e.g., Kogan and Wallach, 1967) assume that the differences 
between decisions made by persons alone and in groups come about 
because of changes in risk preferences. It is assumed by these theories 
that there exist psychological processes deriving from the group situa- 
tion which lead the individual to change his “normal” level of risk- 
taking. While there is widespread agreement that changes in individual 
risk preferences do indeed occur when the individual joins a group, 
there is no particular agreement about the psychological processes that 
are implicated in these changes. One theory maintains, for instance, 
that changes in the members’ risk preference occur because responsibility 
for the decision is diffused throughout the group (Wallach, Kogan, and 
Bern, 1964). Another assumes that the group setting gives the individual 
an opportunity to Ieam that, relative to cultural standards, his risk level 
is lower than he previously imagined (Brown, 1965; Hinds, 1962; Stoner, 
1968). Other theories assume that risk level changes because the person 
is more familiar with the decision problem in the group setting because 
‘We are grateful to Mr. Edward J. Lichstein, who helped us in collecting and 
tabulating the data. 
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he then sees it a second time (Bateson, 1966; Flanders and Thistlethwaite, 
1967), or that group members with higher risk preferences are more 
influential and persuade the others to choose riskier courses of action 
(Clausen, 1965; Wallach, Kogan, and Burt, 1968). 
A recent study by Zajonc, Wolosin, Wolosin, and Sherman ( 1968) 
attempted to determine whether the risky shift phenomenon could be 
explained, without assuming such changes in individual risk preference. 
The task used in that experiment was different from the so-called “choice 
dilemma” task typically employed in other studies of group risk-taking. It 
required subjects to predict which of two events would occur on each of 
a series of 360 trials. One event occurred with a probability of .6, and the 
other with a probability of .4. Subjects received 1 cent for a correct antic- 
ipation of the first event and 1% cents for a correct anticipation of the 
second event, and they suffered no losses for inaccurate predictions. For 
six blocks of 30 trials all subjects worked alone. Subesequently, one-half 
continued alone while the remaining subjects were formed into three- 
man groups which made the same predictions jointly. 
The argument that changes in individual risk preferences are not a 
necessary condition of the risky shift phenomenon involved the assump- 
tion that groups use the majority rule in arriving at joint decisions. If 
groups proceed by majority rule, a group shift toward greater risk would 
necessarily occur if in our two-choice situation the average of the group 
members’ risk preference were above .5. If, on the other hand, individual 
risk preferences averaged to some value below .5, conservative shifts 
could be expected (Zajonc et al., 1968, p. 92). These derivations about 
the probability that the group will choose a more risky course of action 
when the risk preferences of its members are known required that there 
be no changes in their risk preferences when they joined the group. 
In contrast to most of the experimental literature in this area, the 
groups in our experiment shifted not toward risk but toward caution. 
But, contrary to what one would expect, the individual levels of risk 
preference were not below but above .5. Moreover, a closer analysis of 
the data revealed that the greater was the individual members’ prefer- 
ence for risk, the greater was their shift toward caution when they were 
formed into a group. 
The conclusion drawn from these results was that there probably isn’t 
any simple decision scheme which the groups could have used and 
behaved as they did without a concomitant change in individual prefer- 
ences for risk or for some component of risk. It was speculated, there- 
fore, that individuals changed their choice behavior when placed in the 
group setting, and that this came about through changes in the values 
of decision‘outcomes. Perhaps, once in a group, individuals attached a 
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greater cost to being wrong and a greater value to being right, and, 
consequently, refrained from suggesting or supporting the risky alter- 
native which, of course, had a higher probability of being wrong. If the 
psychological value of being correct in the group situation is denoted 
by x then the expected value of the frequent alternative became .6 cents 
+.6x, while the expected value of the infrequent alternative became 
.6 cents + .4x. Under these conditions a preference for the more frequent 
alternative was simply a matter of maximizing expected value and not 
of change in risk preferences.” 
However, because the individual choices averaged rather close to an 
indifference level (.522), and because there were no other direct sup- 
porting data, the above remained merely a conjecture. The purpose of 
the present experiment is to determine whether these results will also 
obtain when individual choices are made initially more extreme and also, 
because of the peculiar nature of our findings, to replicate the previous 
study. In one condition of the present experiment the probabilities of 
the two events were .8 and .2, and in the other, .6 and .4, as before. In 
both conditions the expected values of the outcomes associated with 
each choice were the same ( .6$). The payoffs were 5% and 3 cents in 
the first condition, and 1 and 1% cents in the other. If our conjecture 
about the results of the first study were correct, we should obtain a 
stronger conservative shift in the .8-.2 condition than in the .6-.4 con- 
dition. According to this conjecture, in the former condition the expected 
value of the more frequent alternative is .6 cents + .8x while that of the 
less frequent alternative is .6 cents + .2x, a considerably greater differ- 
ence between the expected values of the alternatives than in the .6-.4 
condition. If there were indeed a change in the expected value of the 
outcomes which derive from the group situation, then a greater shift 
toward conservatism should be observed in the .8-.2 condition than in 
the .6-.4 condition. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Eighty-four subjects, all male undergraduates, were recruited from the paid 
psychology subject pool. A minimum of $1.25 per hour was guaranteed. When 
* Pruitt and Teger (1968) claim that cautious shifts occurred in our study be- 
cause the groups had only 20 seconds to discuss their choices. While this is true for 
each trial, Pruitt and Teger ignore the fact that the groups had three minutes before 
each block of 30 trisls, and could comfortably discuss their choices for the next 30 
trials. Moreover, nothing prevented the subjects from discussing choices during the 
came of each trial block. 
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scheduled, subjects were told neither about the purpose of the experiment nor that 
they could earn a greater sum of money during its course. 
Apparatus 
Two J&-watt lights, mounted on a small panel, served to signal stimulus events. 
One light was marked either 1 cent or H cents. The other was marked either l?$ cents 
or 3 cents. For half of the subjects in each condition, the left stimulus light was 
associated with the higher payoff, and for the remainder, with the lower payoff. A 
punched-tape program controlled the timing and sequence of stimulus events. Sub- 
jects were equipped with switches for making their choices and poker chips for 
tallying their winnings. Stimulus events and subjects’ responses were recorded on 
an Esterline-Angus Event Recorder. 
Design and Procedure 
All subjects were given 360 trials in 12 blocks of 30 trials each. There were two 
stimulus conditions to which subjects were randomly assigned: 
.6-.4 Condition. The two stimuli were programmed with .6 and .4 probabilities 
of occurrence. The payoffs for this condition were 1 cent and 1% cents, respectively. 
.8-.2 Condition. The stimuli were programmed with probabilities of occurrence 
equal to .8 and .2. In this condition the payoffs were % cents and 3 cents. The 
sequence of stimulus events was random, with the constraint that one or the other 
of the above probabilities would be observed in each block of 30 trials. 
Upon arriving at the laboratory, subjects were met by the experimenter and taken 
to their individual cubicles where they all worked alone for the first 180 trials. After 
a short while, the following taped instructions were given over an intercom system. 
(The instructions reproduced here refer to the .6-.4 condition. For the .8-.2 condi- 
tion, the words “5 (3) cents” were substituted in the appropriate slots.) 
In front of you, you see two lights. Every seven seconds one or the other 
will go on. You also see two response plates. During each 7-second interval 
you are to press one plate or the other to anticipate which light will come on. 
If  you press the left plate and the left light comes on, you win 1 (1%) cents. 
If  you press the right plate and the right light comes on, you win 1% (one ) 
cents. If  you press one plate and the opposite light comes on you win nothing. 
Also, if you fail to press within the ‘I-second interval, you win nothing. 
You can keep track of your winnings by the chips which you see in front 
of you. If  you win 1 cent by anticipating the left (right) light, place a white 
chip into your bank. If  you win 1% cents by anticipating the right (left) light, 
place a blue chip into your bank. Your winnings will also be kept auto- 
matically. We guarantee you a minimum of $1.25 per hour and you get to keep 
whatever you win over that amount; that is, you will get $1.25 per hour, or 
your winnings, whichever is more. 
Stimuli were presented every 7 seconds and there was a l-minute rest period 
after each trial block. Blue poker chips were always associated with the high payoff 
light, and white poker chips with the low payoff light. 
IG Treatment. At the end of the sixth trial block subjects in the Individual-Group 
(IG) treatment were told that the first part of the experiment was over. The experi- 
menter then met all three subjects and led them to a room equipped with apparatus 
identical to that which they had used alone. Taped instructions were again issued 
over the intercom: 
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Ag& YOU see the lights and the plates. Now you are working as a team. 
This time one or the other light will go on every 20 seconds. During this interval 
the three of you will work together to come to a uuauimo~~ decision as to 
which plate to press. After you decide, one of you will press the plate. We will 
tell you who will begin pressing, and we will also tell you when to switch. 
Once again, if you press the left plate and the left light comes on, each of YOU 
wins 1 (1%) cent. I f  you press the right plate and the right light comes on, 
each of you wins 1% (one) cents. If  you press one plate and the other comes 
on, or if you fail to press within the 20-second interval, each of you wins 
nothing. Either you all win or all lose on every trial. Again, you can keep 
track of your winnings by placing the appropriate chips in YOUI bank. 
Six blocks of 30 trials, each separated by 3-minute intervals between the blocks, 
were given. As announced to the subjects, there was a 20-second iutertrial interval. 
Each subject pressed the plates during two of the six intervals. 
II Treatnwnt. At the end of the sixth trial block subjects iu the Iudividual- 
Individual (II) treatment were told that the first part of the experiment was over. 
They were then taken out of their cubicles by the experimenter and allowed to relax 
for about 3 or 4 minutes. They were not permitted, however, to speak to one another. 
After the rest period, they were ushered back to their cubicles aud continued as 
previously for six blocks of 30 trials. 
After the experimental session, au explanation of the experiment was given, aud 
the subjects were paid their wages and given their winnings. They were asked not 
to divulge the details of the experiment to their friends or acquaintances. 
RESULTS 
As previously, the results are reported in percentages of risky choices. 
Table 1 shows these choices for the two stimulus conditions (.&4 and 
.8-.2) and for the control (II) and experimental (IG) treatments. Figure 
1 graphs them for the 12 trial blocks. An analysis of variance was per- 
formed in which the between-subject factors tested were conditions and 
treatments, and in which the only within-subject factor was trial blocks, 
with the first and second I80-tria1 sessions nested within trial bIocks. 
TABLE 1 
PERCBNTAGIES OF RISKY CHOICES MADE BY INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS 






II (Individual-Individual) 42. &” 40.9.6 
IG (Individual-Group) 51.6, 46.6t 
.8-.2 Condition 
II (Individual-Individual) %.ocd 28.9, 
IG (Individual-Group) %.8b 37.7bd 
a Means having different subscripts are significantly different from each other at the 
.05 level. 
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FE. 1. Percentage of risky choices in B-.4 and .8-2 conditions. 
The degrees of freedom in the error term were reduced because the 
individual scores were grouped in order to equate the reliability of the 
data points associated with individual and group treatments. As in the 
previous experiment, random “groups” of three subjects were composed 
from the II subjects and treated as single data points, thus achieving a 
comparability with the IG treatment, in which the data points are neces- 
sarily based on groups of three subjects. 
This analysis of variance revealed a significant treatment effect (F = 
7.07, 1 and 24 df, p < AX>, with the IG treatment showing a greater 
average number of risky choices across sessions and across conditions, 
There was also an overall effect of conditions (F = 27.71, 1 and 24 df, 
RISK-TAKING IN A TWO-CHOICE SITUATION 133 
p < .OOl), with the .6-.4 condition showing a greater overall number of 
risky choices. But, contrary to expectations, there was also a significant 
interaction between treatments, conditions, and sessions (F = 3.35, I 
and 264 df, p < .O5). This interaction results because the IG subjects 
reduced their average number of risky choices in the .6-.4 condition but 
increased it in the .8.2 condition. Comparisons among the cell means 
indicate that this change is significant beyond the .05 level for the .6-.4 
condition, and that it just fails to reach it for the .8-.2 condition. 
As previously, a correlation was found between the prior level of risk 
and the amount of shift. For the .6-.4 condition this correlation was 
- .49, which is somewhat less than the -.79 found previously. However, 
in the .8-.2 condition a rather substantial correlation of .--89 was found. 
These correlations indicate that the greater is the level of risk of the 
individuals working alone the greater is their shift toward caution (or 
lesser shift toward risk) when they are formed into three-man groups. 
DISCUSSION 
Two sets of Endings of importance emerge from this experiment. 
First, the previous results were replicated. There was again a significant 
conservative shift in the .6-.4 condition; there was again a negative 
correlation between prior risk preference and the amount of shift, and 
also observed was the upswing in risk preference toward the close of the 
second session. In the present experiment, however, this upswing occurs 
primarily in the IG treatment. In the previous paper we speculated 
that this effect could be attributed to a sort of “last ditch” stance which 
the subjects assumed when the close of the experiment was in sight. 
This speculation is more cogent for the present results, however. In the 
present experiment, as in the previous, all subjects were scheduled for a 
2-hour participation. Hence, after 10 or 11 trial blocks subjects in the 
IG treatment (who were given 20-second intertrial intervals in the group 
session, and who, therefore were in fact nearing two hours of participa- 
tion at the twelfth trial block) had fairly good grounds to believe that 
their task was nearing the end. Subjects in the II treatment remained on 
a schedule of 7-second intervals throughout the experiment, and at the 
beginning of the twelfth trial block had worked for less than 1% hours. 
Hence, they would be less likely to regard the twelfth trial block as 
the last one. 
The second finding of this study is that the .8-.2 subjects instead of 
shifting toward conservatism even more than the .6-.4 subjects, changed 
in the direction of greater risk. Clearly, if there is a change in the indi- 
vidual’s choice behavior when he joins the group, it cannot possibly be 
explained by the processes we have conjectured in the previous paper. 
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The data, however, lend themselves to a somewhat diiferent analysis, 
one which returns to our previous assumption that a shift toward risk 
or conservatism requires no changes in individual risk preferences. (This 
assumption, of course, does not preclude the possibility that there are 
conditions where shifts toward risk do occur and where there are con- 
comitant changes in individual risk preferences of the group members.) 
We shall now offer a different (although still rather simple) model of 
individual and group risk-taking. 
Since we are dealing with a form of probability learning, one of the 
various mathematical models for such learning could be applied to the 
individual data, and then extended to groups. Unfortunately, none of 
these models seems to fit the individual data, mainly because they have 
been constructed for the one-payoff case, that is, for the case where 
accuracy on the frequent and on the infrequent alternatives results in 
the same reward. The alternatives, therefore, have different expected 
values. 
Let us then consider the following two-stage model for the case where 
there are two alternatives, A and B, A occurring with the probability 
p(A) and B with the probability p(B), and p(A) > p(B). We shall 
assume that under these conditions, at the onset of any trial the individual 
is in one of three states: (a) He is certain that A and only A will occur; 
(b) he is certain that B and only B will occur; (c) he believes that either 
A or B will occur. Let us label these three states A, B, and AU B. We 
will assume arbitrarily that the individual’s probabilities of being in 
these states correspond to the objective stimulus probabilities. Thus, the 
probability of being in state A, P(A), is equal to the probability that 
the event A will occur times the probability that the event B will not 
occur. For the .6-.4 condition we have P(A) = pA( 1 - pB) = .36. For 
subjects in the same condition the probability of being in state B is 
P(B) = pB( 1 - pA) = .16. And the probability of being in state A U B 
is equal to the complement of the sum of the two above probabilities 
P(A) and P(B), and for the present example p(AU B) = .48. 
We shall further assume that if the individual is in state A or in state 
B he will remain in that state and make his response accordingly for 
that trial. State A U B, however, is unstable, and the individual will not 
remain in it. If in state AU B at the onset of the trial the individual 
will move either to state A or to state B before making a response. Again 
one must make an assumption about the probabilities of moving from 
A U B to A and to B, and one possibility, of course, is to assume that 
the movement from A U B to A and to B is equiprobable. But this 
assumption does not correspond to the observed data. One could also 
assume that the movement from state AU B to A and to B follows the 
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objective probabilities of A and B, such that in the .8.4 condition, for 
instance, on 60% of the trials the individual moves from A U B to A, and 
on 40% to B. This assumption also does not fit the results. The third, 
equally simple assumption, is that the movement from state AU B to A 
and to B follows the payoffs for A and B. Thus, for instance, if A pays 
1 cent and B pays l!i cents then the movement from A U B to A and to 
B will be distributed according to the ratio of 1: 1%. It is this assumption 
which we shall make for now. Table 2 shows the initial and terminal 
TABLE 2 
INITIAL AND TERMINAL PROBABILITIES OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICES 




















probabilities of being in the various states for the .6-.4 and the .8-.2 
conditions. These predictions correspond fairly well to the observed 
results. 
It should be noted that the above model has no free parameters to be 
estimated from the data. The predictions are made entirely from the 
objective stimulus probabilities, and the objective payoffs. Hence, it 
allows no individual variations. Yet it will be seen that for the present 
purposes it is fairly satisfactory. The model predicts 44.8% risky choices 
for the .6-.4 condition and 29.6% for the .8-.2 condition. Actually, on the 
last three trial blocks of the first session there were 39.7% and 51.3% risky 
choices in the II and IG treatments of the .6-.4 condition, and 34.9% and 
26.4% in these treatments in the .8-.2 conditions. The combined results 
average to 45.5% for the .6-.4 case and 30.7% for the .8-.2 case. 
What happens when three-man groups are formed? Let us assume 
that the individual does not change in the group situation, and that he 
will vote according to the previous probabilities. Hence, before voting 
he will again be in one of two fiuaI stages, A or B, with AU B having 
been resolved beforehand according to the payoffs for A and B. If this 
is the case then we can enumerate four initial states for each group: 
AAA, AAB, ABB, and BBB, where each term in the triads represents 
one member’s individual state. If no changes in individual risk prefer- 
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ewes occur, and if the above model does indeed describe individual 
choices in the group situation, then the initial probabilities of these 
group states for the two conditions are as given in Table 3 below. 
TABLE 3 
INITIAL AND TERMINAL PROBABILITIES OF GROUP CHOICES 
ACCORDING TO THE TWO-STAGE MODEL 
Group state 
on trial n 
.6-.4 Condition A-.2 condition 
Initial Terminal Initial Terminal 
stage stage stage stage 
AAA .168--!.%.+.578 .~g.-.-1-0--&Q 
AABa 
\>W *A ;6?,=+ 
.410-‘* .OOO .440::, 
-A!!3 
.OOJ 
BBB .090-L~O---~.422 .()26--!.o:::b 358 
,fl rc’ 0.0 \_p,= 
ABBa ,332~ 
,b 
,000 .185”’ .OCQ 
a Each of these states can occur in three different ways, which are considered equiv- 
alent for the present purposes. 
It is safe to assume that if the group is unanimous it will remain 
in that state until the termination of the trial. Groups that are in state 
AAA will vote A and groups that are in state BBB will vote B. The ques- 
tion arises about groups in which there is disagreement. Again we shall 
make an assumption which takes the payoffs of the events into account 
rather than their probabilities of occurrence. In the .6-.4 condition a 
group which is in state ABB has two individuals absolutely certain that 
B will occur and that A will not occur, and one individual who is abso- 
lutely certain that A will occur and that B will not occur. The indi- 
viduals who are in state B expect to win 1% cents, while the person in 
the minority expects to win just one penny. Hence, in this group we 
have 3 cents against 1 cent, and it is fairly safe to assume that the two 
B’s will convince the single A. In the group which is in the AAB state 
the situation is less certain. The A’s have two pennies together against 
the minority’s 1% cents. Since the combined prize for the majority is 
higher, we will again say that the majority choice will prevail, and 
groups which are in the state AAB will move toward A with probability 
1.0. These assumptions-quite tentative, to be sure--lead us to predict 
that in the .6-.4 condition there will be a conservative shift, and that 
these groups will average 42.2% risky choices. The actual figure, we note 
from Table 1, is not too far from the predicted value, namely 46.6%. It 
will be recalled that in the previous experiment this figure was closer yet 
to the prediction (44.6%). 
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Consider now the .8-.2 condition in which, contrary to our initial 
expectations, we found a shift toward risk. Again in the ABB-state there 
will be a strong tendency for the majority to carry the group because 
together they have 6 cents against the minority’s X cents. However, the 
situation is definitely unstable in the AAB case. Here both members of 
the majority expect to win together only 1% cents, while the member 
betting on B is sure that he will win 3 cents. It may, therefore, be some- 
what difficult for the majority, under these circumstances, to bring the 
minority into accord. Homans’ (1961) theory of social exchange holds 
that influence can be exerted on the individual if he suffers no significant 
losses in yielding to it. He is able to resist influence, however, if such 
resistance promises some gains. Camilleri and Berger (1967) have re- 
cently proposed a model of group decision-making based on Homans” 
formulation. Their model leads to the consequence that when the 
expected gains of the alternatives are equal, the alternatives will be 
chosen with equal probabiIity. Thus, because our data showed clearly 
unequal choices, even though the expected values of the two alternatives 
were equal, the Camille&Berger model cannot be applied to our data 
unless some assumptions are made about subjective utility of risk and 
caution, or the like, such that the subjective expected values of the 
alternatives become equal. 
While various assumptions can again be made for the ABB case, we 
shall assume that when such a state exists, the group will reach decisions 
simply by taking turns according to individual preferences. Another way 
of saying this is that the state AAB will be distributed in the ratio of 
2: 1 in favor of A. We have computed the terminal probabilities for the 
group states in the .8-.2 condition according to this assumption and they 
are also shown in Table 3. This assumption does predict a shift toward 
risk, and the predicted figure is 35.8% risky choices, which compares 
quite favorably with the observed 37.7%. 
The above tentative parameter-free model may provide a basis from 
which a more comprehensive formulation about risk-taking in groups 
may emerge. It wilI necessariIy require some empirical parameters, and 
their choice wil1 depend on future resuhs. These parameters may be 
suggested by the negative correlations between prior risk levels and 
shift toward risk. What form they will take, however, is not clear to us 
at the moment. With the small amount of data thus far collected it is 
neither necessary nor advisabIe to elaborate the model further. More- 
over, a model that utilizes no data in making successful predictions about: 
them (Table 4 summarizes the comparisons between predicted and ob-~ 
served values) deserves to be entertained for at least as long as there ia 
no contradictory empirical evidence. 
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TABLE 4 





II Treatment IG Treatment 
-- 
Observed Observed 
(last three (all six 
Predicted trial blocks) Predicted trial blocks) 
.448 .455 .422 .466 
.407 .423 .362 .388 
.296 .307 .358 .377 
There is some additional support for this model from another study, 
just completed, which was carried out for a different purpose, and the 
results of which were not known at the time the model was con- 
structed. In that study the probabilities of the events A and B were 67 
and .33 and the payoffs associated with these probabilities were 1 cent 
and 2 cents. The model predicts that, given the above event probabilities, 
the individual should make 40.7% risky choices. The observed asymptotic 
averages (last 90 trials of the individual session) in two different condi- 
tions, each with 24 subjects, were 41.7% and 43.0%. 
In one of these conditions, after the initial 180 individual trials, three- 
man groups were formed in which the members were required to 
express their own preferences on each trial, in full view of each other, 
and in which the group choice was arbitrarily defined according to the 
majority rule. The members in these groups shared the group gains 
equally. It is possible to determine for these groups the actual propor- 
tion of each of the four possible group states, AAA, AAB, ABB, and 
BBB. The observed proportions were .271, .341, .264, and .124, respec- 
tively. According to the model they should have been .208, .429, .295, 
and 967. It appears, therefore, that the model underestimates the num- 
ber of unanimities. It is interesting to note, however, that the observed 
data nevertheless do conform to the model in general: There is a shift 
toward conservatism to the extent predicted. The percentage of B 
choices made by the groups according to the majority rule is 38.818, a 
figure not far removed from the predicted 36.2% (based on the addition 
of the ABB and the BBB states). 
The agreement between the predicted and observed data together 
with the underestimation of unanimities and overestimation of mixed 
cases suggests that there takes place a group process which enhances 
conformity within a given trial but which assures independence across 
trials. That is, the group members attempt to maintain their initial 
individual risk preferences while working in a group. But on. each trial 
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they arrange their choices so as to maximize agreement with one another. 
Across a series of trials, however, they vary their choices so as to 
average to the same proportion as that characteristic of their individual 
trials. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the observed per- 
centage of individual choices during the group session was 41.4% as 
compared to the 41.7% which was the average of the asymptotic choices 
made by these same subjects before they joined their respective groups. 
That the average of the individual choices remained the same in both 
sessions does not mean, of course, that no subject changed his level of 
risk-taking after joining the group. The absolute changes in individual 
risk levels were, therefore, computed and they averaged to 13.2%, which 
is significantly different from zero. We do not know, however, how much 
of this figure is to be attributed to group effects and how much to a 
simple instability of choices. The proper comparison is a control condi- 
tion in which subjects made decisions alone during the first and during 
the last 180 trials. This condition showed an average absolute change 
of 9.1Ssmaller than the change in the IG groups but still substantial. 
The difference between the amount of absolute change in risk in the 
individual and group conditions was not significant (t = 1.50, 46 df). 
The assumption is thus supported that no dramatic changes in individual 
risk preference (or in subjective expected value) occur when the 
individual joins the group, even when the average of group choices 
differs from the average of individual choices. 
It should perhaps be noted in closing that, in contrast to other models 
of choice behavior, the model presented above places a special emphasis 
on outcomes. We assumed, namely, that under uncertainty the indi- 
vidual as well as the group will act neither so as to maximize expected 
value nor to maximize the accuracy of prediction, but that they will tend 
to follow payoffs. But, while the model deviates from the typical choice 
behavior formulation, it is rather consistent with current trends in re- 
search on the risky shift phenomenon, for it is characteristic of the most 
recent work also to pay particular attention to utilities and outcomes in 
dealing with the problem. Thus, for instance, working with life dilemmas, 
Stoner (1968) proposed that group discussion engages cultural values 
associated with outcomes, while Marquis and Reitz ( I963), who em- 
ployed a gambling situation, suggested that group discussion enhances 
prior expected value. 
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